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Abstract
This paper examines strategic subsidy/tax policy in a third-country market model
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ing rm must use the carrier. We show that under Cournot duopoly, the optimal
policy is an export tax if the degree of product dierentiation is large enough. In a
Bertrand duopoly, the optimal policy is always the export tax. We also show that
the subsidized rm's exports in the Cournot duopoly are larger than those in the
Bertrand duopoly if the degree of product di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1 Introduction
A central issue in strategic trade policy is rent-shifting. As shown by Brander and
Spencer (1985), the government has an incentive to oer a positive export subsidy for
its domestic rm in order to shift rent from a foreign competitor to a domestic one.1
This strategic motive of government and the rent-shifting eect have been extensively
examined.2 In strategic export policy arguments, there has been a focus on rent-
shifting among exporting rms and its eects on recommended export policy, but the
role of international carriers and transport prices have not been paid much attention
to. In contrast, recent empirical studies have emphasized that transport prices have a
growing impact on export activity: for example, carriers have a certain monopoly power
and maritime transport prices are marked up (Hummels et al., 2009), and transport
prices are frequently a greater barrier than taris (Clark et al., 2004; Hummels, 2007).
These empirical ndings point out that transport charges have a considerable eect
on exports. Because higher charges raise export costs, they possibly damp exports,
can induce rent-shifting from exporting rms to carriers, and aect the recommended
export policy.
This paper considers changes that appear in a recommended export policy when
a monopoly carrier is incorporated into a third-country market model with product
dierentiation. We examine the following three-stage game: rst, the home govern-
ment chooses a subsidy/tax rate for its domestic rm. Second, the monopoly carrier
1The recommended export policy substantially diers based on the mode of competition. See
Brander (1995) and Eaton and Grossman (1986).
2For a systematic survey of strategic trade policy, see Brander (1995) and Chang and Katayama
(1995).
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decides its transport charge. Third, two exporting rms compete in the third market.
We show that in a Cournot duopoly, the optimal policy is an export tax if the degree
of product dierentiation is not small; however, in a Bertrand duopoly, the optimal
policy is always an export tax. The subsidy/tax works as a commitment device for
the carrier: a decrease (an increase) in the subsidy (tax) reduces the transport charge.
Because this eect in the Cournot case is stronger when the degree of product dier-
entiation is large, the government imposes an export tax (negative subsidy). Reducing
transport charges and preventing rent-extraction from the domestic rm to the carrier
is consistent with restraining excess production in price competition. Thus, the opti-
mal policy in a Bertrand duopoly is an export tax. We also show that the subsidized
home rm's Cournot output is larger than the Bertrand one if the degree of product
dierentiation is suciently small. This is because the optimal policy in a Cournot
duopoly is a positive subsidy when the degree of product dierentiation is small, but
the optimal policy in a Bertrand duopoly is always an export tax.
This paper is related to several studies on the role of transport prices and the market
power of carriers in international trade (Abe et al., 2014; Behrens et al., 2009; Behrens
and Picard, 2011; Francois and Wooton, 2001; Kleinert and Spies, 2011; Takauchi,
2015).3 These studies incorporate an international carrier (or transportation service
industry) into various trade models. Although they focus on the market power of the
carrier, they do not consider the strategic export policy. This paper is also related to
some works on unionized oligopoly models with a strategic export policy (Bandyopad-
3Recently, several studies have considered the role of transport facilities (airports/seaports) and
pricing strategy in an international oligopoly. See Matsumura and Matsushima (2012) and Matsushima
and Takauchi (2014).
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hyay and Bandyopadhyay, 1998, 1999; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2000).4 Various oligopoly
models examine a change in a recommended export policy when a labor union exits.
Particularly, Bandyopadhyay et al. (2000) consider the optimal export policy in a third-
country market model when the product market is a Bertrand duopoly. They show that
the optimal policy is an export subsidy as long as the degree of product dierentiation
is not too small. In their model, union rent is included in the domestic welfare of the
exporting country, and each exporter's union individually decides its wage. These two
points crucially dier from our model. In their model, a higher subsidy increases the
wage rate and union rent, and this eect dominates as long as the product market
is not extremely competitive. Because the government can improve domestic welfare
through an increase in union rent, it has an incentive to oer an export subsidy under
a Bertrand duopoly.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the model
setup. Section 3 derives the Cournot and Bertrand outcomes and examines the optimal
policy in each mode of competition. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We consider the Brander and Spencer (1985) model with a monopoly carrier. There are
three countries: two dierent exporting countries, home and foreign, which each have
a single exporting rm, and one consuming country that does not have any producers.
The home and foreign products are dierentiated. The inverse dierentiated demand
4Some works focus on the eect of lobbying activities for export policy. See, for example, Bandy-
opadhyay et al. (2004) and Ma (2008).
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in the consuming country is
px = 1  x  y; py = 1  y   x;
where px (py) is the product price of the home (foreign) rm, x (y) is the output of the
home (foreign) rm, and  is the degree of product dierentiation between the home
and foreign products. When the home and foreign products are homogeneous,  = 1;
when these products are maximally dierentiated,  = 0. Throughout the analysis,
we assume that 0   < 1. Using these inverse dierentiated demand functions, the
following dierentiated demand is derived.
x =
1  px    + py
(1  )(1 + ) ; y =
1  py    + px
(1  )(1 + ) :
The home and foreign rms do not have means of long-distance transportation,
so the rms must use a carrier and pay a per-unit transport charge t to the carrier
when they supply those products to the consuming country. We assume that the home
and foreign rms have symmetric technology. They incur a constant marginal cost c
(0  c < 1) to produce their respective products. However, we consider that the home
government solely subsidizes to the home rm. Oering a per-unit subsidy s, the home
rm's marginal production cost is c  s. The prot of the home rm (H) and foreign
rm (F ) are
H  (px   (c  s)  t)x; F  (py   c  t)y: (1)
The carrier makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the home and foreign rms and
decides the transport charge t. We also assume that the carrier does not price-
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discriminate. The carrier belongs to the consuming country and transports x + y
units of products; thus, its prot is given by r  (t  t0)(x+ y), where t0 is a unit cost
associated with transportation. For simplicity, we set t0 as 0, and thus, r  (x+ y)t.5
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the home government chooses an export
subsidy/tax rate s. Second, the carrier decides its charge t. Last, the home and foreign
rms compete in the consuming country's market. The game is solved using backward
induction.
3 Results
We rst examine a Cournot duopoly in the product market. In Section 3.2, we consider
a Bertrand duopoly.
3.1 Cournot duopoly
Third stage. Taking the subsidy/tax rate s and transport charge t as a given, each rm
decides quantities for its product. The inverse dierentiated demand and (1) yield the
following rst-order conditions (FOCs) for the prot maximization of rms.
1  c  t+ s  2x  y = 0;
1  c  t  x  2y = 0:
Solving these FOCs, we obtain the outputs in the third stage.
xC(s; t) =
(1  c  t)(2  ) + 2s
(2  )(2 + ) ; y
C(s; t) =
(1  c  t)(2  )  s
(2  )(2 + ) : (2)
5This assumption does not alter our results.
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Under Cournot competition, we denote the outcomes in each stage of the game as \C."
Second stage. Under a given s, the carrier decides its charge. Because the carrier
transports xC(s; t) + yC(s; t) units of products (i.e., use (2)), the prot maximization
problem of the carrier is
max
t
rC(s; t) = max
t
(2(1  c) + s  2t)t
2 + 
:
From this maximization problem, the FOC for the prot maximization of the carrier
and its charge are
@rC(s; t)
@t
=
2(1  c) + s  4t
2 + 
= 0 ) tC(s) = 2(1  c) + s
4
:
Substituting tC(s) into (1) and (2), we obtain the second-stage outcomes.
xC(s) =
2(2  )(1  c) + (6 + )s
4(2  )(2 + ) ; 
C
H(s) =

xC(s)
2
;
yC(s) =
2(2  )(1  c)  (2 + 3)s
4(2  )(2 + ) ; 
C
F (s) =

yC(s)
2
:
First stage. To maximize domestic welfare, the home government oers a certain level
of subsidy/tax. The domestic social surplus equals the dierences between the prot
of the home rm and the total subsidy payment: WCH (s)  CH(s)  sxC(s). Thus, the
welfare of the home is given by
WCH (s) =
(1  c)2
4(2 + )2
  (1  c)(2     2
2)s
4(2  )(2 + )2  
(6 + )(10     42)s2
16(4  2)2 :
The welfare maximization problem of the home government yields the following FOC
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and the equilibrium subsidy/tax.6
@WCH (s)
@s
=
 2(1  c)(2  )(2     22)  (6 + )(10     42)s
8(2  )2(2 + )2 = 0
) sC =  2(1  c)(2  )(2     2
2)
(6 + )(10     42) : (3)
Hereafter, we denote the equilibrium value as the asterisk \." From (3), we obtain the
following.
xC =
(1  c)(2  )
10     42 ; y
C =
(1  c)(16  6   52)
(6 + )(10     42) ;
tC =
(1  c)(2 + )(14  5   32)
(6 + )(10     42) : (4)
The equilibrium prot of the rms and carrier are CH = (x
C)2, CF = (y
C)2, and
rC = [2(tC)2]=(2 + ).
We rst consider the eects of a change in  on the export subsidy/tax, transport
charge, and exports for the home and foreign rms.
1
4

@sC
@

=
@tC
@
=
(1  c)(128 + 80   1482 + 83 + 314)
(6 + )2(10     42)2 > 0;
@yC
@
=  2(1  c)(212  100   11
2 + 243 + 104)
(6 + )2(10     42)2 < 0;
@xC
@
=  4(1  c)(2  4 + 
2)
(10     42)2 :
From these results and (3), we establish Lemma 1 and Proposition 1.
Lemma 1. Under Cournot competition, (i) the exports of the home rm are U-shaped,
but the exports of the foreign rm are increasing for the degree of product dierentiation
(decreasing for ); (ii) sC and tC increase as  increases.
6The SOC for welfare maximization always holds, that is, @2WCH (s)=@s
2 =  (6 + )(10     
42)=[8(2  )2(2 + )2] < 0.
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Proof. The sign of @xC=@ depends on  (2  4 + 2). Solving the inequality  (2 
4 + 2)  0 for , 2 p2   < 1. Thus,  (2  4 + 2) < 0 for  < 2 p2. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1. Suppose that a monopoly carrier transports rm products. Under
Cournot competition, (i) the optimal policy is an export subsidy if  > a; (ii) the
optimal policy is free trade if  = a; (iii) the optimal policy is an export tax if  < a,
where a  (
p
17  1)=4 ' 0:780776.
Proof. From (3), the sign of sC depends on  (2      22). Thus, sC > 0 if
 > (
p
17  1)=4, sC = 0 if  = (p17  1)=4, and sC < 0 if  < (p17  1)=4. Q.E.D.
The results of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 are depicted in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 here]
The logic behind Proposition 1 is explained as follows. First, oering a subsidy (or
tax) works a commitment device to the carrier.7 A smaller (larger) s corresponds to
a lower (higher) t (see tC(s)). Second, this commitment works better if the degree of
product dierentiation is large (i.e., if  is small).
The rst point results from the timing of the game. Because the subsidy/tax is
decided in the rst stage of the game, the policy aects the decision of the carrier.
When s rises, the home rm's exports increase but the foreign rm's exports decrease
owing to strategic substitutability in the quantity competition. On the other hand, an
7In a dierent context, Takauchi (2010) focuses on a similar eect of a subsidy policy. He considers
the eects of a subsidy/tax on the content rate of rules of origin in an area with free trade.
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increases in subsidies raises total outputs (i.e., x+y), so the demand for transportation
increases and thus the transport charges rise. A rise in the transport charges reduces
exports in each rm. That is, rent gained by the home rm shifts to the carrier when
the subsidy increases. Therefore, if the rent shift from the foreign rm to the home
rm is smaller and the rent shift from the home rm to the carrier is larger, the home
government has no incentive to choose a positive subsidy. The commitment eect
depends on the degree of product dierentiation. When  is suciently small, each
product is suciently dierentiated and each product market is relatively monopolized.
Then, for the home rm, the eects of the foreign rm's action are small. That is, the
rent shift from the foreign rm to the home rm is small. Thus, a larger (smaller) 
implies that rent shifting from the foreign rm caused a small increase in the subsidy
rate is increased (reduced). Therefore, when  is small, the home government chooses
an export tax (i.e., a negative subsidy) and decreases the transport charge as much as
possible.
In Lemma 1, the eects of  on sC, tC, and yC are intuitive. As mentioned in
the explanation for Proposition 1, an increase in s increases the transport charge but
decreases the foreign rm's exports. Because an increase in  increases the rent-shifting
eect of subsidization, sC increases, and thus, tC is indirectly increased but yC is
reduced. However, the eect of  on exports (and thus, prot) in the home rm is
ambiguous. To examine the eects of , we focus on the third-stage exports in the
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home rm (2). Totally dierentiating and rearranging (2), we nd
dxC
d
=
2
(2  )(2 + )

ds
d

| {z }
(+)
+
 1
2 + 

dt
d

| {z }
( )
+
 (1  c  t)
(2 + )2| {z }
( )
+
4s
(2  )2(2 + )2| {z }
(+)=( )
;
where sign(ds=d) = sign(@sC=@), sign(dt=d) = sign(@tC=@), and s corresponds
to sC. In this equation, (+) denotes a positive value, ( ) denotes a negative value,
and (+)=( ) denotes both positive/negative values; thus, the sign in the sum of all
terms is ambiguous. However, all terms except for the last term have a value that is
either certainly positive or negative. The last term plays a key role in deciding the sign
of dxC=d (i.e., @xC=@). When the home rm oers a positive subsidy, the last term
is positive, and the sign @xC=@ can be positive. Otherwise, the last term is negative
and the sign @xC=@ can be negative. In fact, when  is small, the optimal policy is
an export tax (i.e., s < 0 in the last term) and @xC=@ has a negative value. When 
is suciently large, the last term becomes positive and @xC=@ may be positive.
3.2 Bertrand duopoly
Third stage. The dierentiated demand and (1) yield the following FOCs for the prot
maximization of rms.
1 + c+ t     s  2px + py
(1  )(1 + ) = 0;
1 + c+ t   + px   2py
(1  )(1 + ) = 0:
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From these FOCs, we obtain product prices in the third stage.
pBx (s; t) =
(2 + )(1 + c+ t  )  2s
(2  )(2 + ) ;
pBy (s; t) =
(2 + )(1 + c+ t  )  s
(2  )(2 + ) :
Exports are
xB(s; t) =
(1  c  t)(2     2) + (2  2)s
(2  )(1  )(1 + )(2 + ) ;
yB(s; t) =
(1  c  t)(2     2)  s
(2  )(1  )(1 + )(2 + ) :
Under Bertrand competition, we denote outcomes in each stage of the game as \B."
Second stage. The maximization problem of the carrier is
max
t
rB(s; t) = max
t
(2(1  c) + s  2t)t
(2  )(1 + ) :
This problem yields the following transport charge in the second stage:
@rB(s; t)
@t
=
2(1  c) + s  4t
(2  )(1 + ) = 0 ) t
B(s) =
2(1  c) + s
4
(= tC(s)):
From tB(s), product prices are
pBx (s) =
3 + c  2
2(2  )  
(6  )s
4(4  2) ; p
B
y (s) =
3 + c  2
2(2  ) +
(2  3)s
4(4  2) :
Exports and prots in the second stage are
xB(s) =
2(2     2)(1  c) + (6 +    32)s
4(2  )(1  )(1 + )(2 + ) ; 
B
H(s) = (1  2)

xB(s)
2
;
yB(s) =
2(2     2)(1  c)  (2 + 3   2)s
4(2  )(1  )(1 + )(2 + ) ; 
B
F (s) = (1  2)

yB(s)
2
:
First stage. Similar to the Cournot case, the home government chooses a certain
subsidy/tax rate to maximizes its domestic welfare, WBH (s)  BH(s)   sxB(s). The
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welfare in the home is
WBH (s) =
(1  c)2(1  )
4(2  )2(1 + )  
(1  c)(2   + 2)s
4(2  2)(1 + )(2 + )
  (10     
2)(6 +    32)s2
16(2  )2(1  )(1 + )(2 + )2 :
The maximization problem of the Home government yields the following FOC and the
equilibrium subsidy/tax rate.8
@WBH (s)
@s
=  2(1  c)(1  )(2 + )(2   + 
2)
8(4  2)(1  2)  
(10     2)(6 +    32)s
8(4  2)(1  2) = 0
) sB =  2(1  c)(1  )(2 + )(2   + 
2)
(10     2)(6 +    32) < 0: (5)
Thus, the optimal policy is an export tax.
The equilibrium tax formula in (5) yields
pBx =
48  8   302 + 33 + 34 + (12 + 12   72   3)c
(10     2)(6 +    32) ;
pBy =
44  2   342 + 53 + 34 + (16 + 6   32   33)c
(10     2)(6 +    32) ;
xB =
(1  c)(2 + )
(1 + )(10     2) ; y
B =
(1  c)(16 + 10   52   3)
(1 + )(10     2)(6 +    32) ;
tB =
(1  c)(2  )(14 + 9   52   23)
(10     2)(6 +    32) : (6)
The prot of the rms and the carrier are BH = (1  2)(xB)2, BF = (1  2)(yB)2,
and rB = [2(tB)2]=[(2  )(1 + )], respectively.
8The SOC for the welfare maximization always holds, that is, @2WBH (s)=@s
2 =  (10     2)(6 +
   32)=[8(2  2)(1  )(1 + )(2 + )2] < 0.
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The comparative statics of (6) for  yield
@pBx
@
=
 (1  c)D1
(10     2)2(6 +    2)2 < 0;
@pBy
@
=
 (1  c)D2
(10     2)2(6 +    2)2 < 0;
1
4

@sB
@

=
@tB
@
=
(1  c)E
(10     2)2(6 +    32)2 > 0;
@xB
@
=
 2(1  c)(4  4   42   3)
(1 + )2(10     2)2 ;
@yB
@
=
2(1  c)F
(1 + )2(10     2)2(6 +    32)2 ;
where D1  36+425 574 2003+1642+48+672 > 0, D2  96+185+634 
2403 4262+824+296 > 0, E  6 345 114+1363+842 208+128 > 0,
and F  37 + 256   355   2664 + 1263 + 7552 + 228   212.
From (5) and the results of the comparative statics, we obtain the following.
Proposition 2. Under Bertrand competition, the optimal policy is an export tax in
the presence of a monopoly carrier.
Lemma 2. Under Bertrand competition, (i) product prices in the home and foreign
rms decrease, the rate of export tax decreases, and the transport charge increases as 
increases; (ii) exports in the home and foreign rms are U-shaped for .
Proof. The sign of @xB=@ depends on  (4  4  42  3), and the sign of @yB=@
depends on F . Using numerical calculation,  (4  4   42   3) < () 0 if  < ()
~  0:594313; F < () 0 if  < () ^  0:398778. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 is relatively intuitive. Under price competition, excess production
occurs. The exporting country's government has an incentive to restrain this excess
13
production and raise the price of the product of the domestic rm (Markusen et al.,
1995). Furthermore, in our model, the home government has an incentive to prevent
rent extraction from the home rm to the carrier and decrease the subsidy (or in-
crease the tax) in order to reduce the transport charge. For these two reasons, the
home government imposes an export tax when the product market is under Bertrand
competition. This result is in sharp contrast to Bandyopadhyay et al. (2000): in two
exporting countries with a labor union (wage setter) and one consuming country with
a market share rivalry model, they consider an optimal export policy. Under Bertrand
competition, they show that the optimal policy is an export subsidy as long as the degree
of product dierentiation is not too small (i.e., except for the case where  is close to 1).
The dierence in results mainly depends on the following factors: in Bandyopadhyay et
al. (2000), domestic welfare includes union rent and each country's union individually
sets its wage rate. The union oers a higher wage if the domestic subsidy increases.
Because an increase in the domestic subsidy increases output and labor demand in the
domestic rm, the union oers a higher wage rate if the domestic subsidy increases. In
addition, through an interaction in the wage-setting stage of two unions, an increase
in the domestic subsidy indirectly reduces the other country's wage rate and product
price; thus, market competition is even keener. Therefore, a positive domestic subsidy
induces a large increase in the domestic wage rate and union rent. As a result, in their
model, the government can increase domestic welfare through a large increase in union
rent by oering a positive subsidy.
The result in Lemma 2 can be explained as follows. A large  corresponds to
14
keen competition in the product market such that product prices in both the home
and foreign rms decrease as  increases (i.e., @pBx =@ < 0 and @pBy =@ < 0). Be-
cause the home rm has a tax burden, increased competition makes the rm further
disadvantaged. Thus, the home government reduces the export tax when  increases
(@sB=@ > 0). Because the subsidy/tax increases as  increases, the transport charge
increases when  increases (@tB=@ > 0). The nature of the transport charge is the
same in the Cournot duopoly (i.e., in the second-stage Nash equilibrium of two com-
petition modes, tB(s) = tC(s) holds).
In the Bertrand duopoly, exports in the home and foreign rms are U-shaped for .
This result is basically the same as the outcome of the standard dierentiated Bertrand
duopoly.9 However, in our model, by incorporating the carrier, the model logic diers
from the standard one (e.g., Eaton and Grossman, 1986). To see this, let us employ
a similar method in the Cournot duopoly used previously. Totally dierentiating the
third-stage exports and rearranging them, we obtain
dxB
d
=
2  2
(4  2)(1  2)

ds
d

| {z }
(+)
+
 2
(2  )(1 + )

dt
d

| {z }
( )
+
2(6  42 + 4)s
(4  2)2(1  2)2| {z }
( )
+
 (1  2)(1  c  t)
(2  )2(1 + )2| {z }
(+)=( )
;
9For example, substituting s = t = 0 into xB(s; t) and yB(s; t), we obtain (1   c)=[(2   )(1 + )],
which is U-shaped for .
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and
dyB
d
=
 
(4  2)(1  2)

ds
d

| {z }
( )
+
 1
(2  )(1 + )

dt
d

| {z }
( )
+
 (4 + 52   34)s
(4  2)2(1  2)2| {z }
(+)
+
 (1  2)(1  c  t)
(2  )2(1 + )2| {z }
(+)=( )
;
where sign(ds=d) = sign(@sB=@), sign(dt=d) = sign(@tB=@), and s corresponds
to sB < 0. The home rm has a positive eect from the reduced tax but suers a
negative eect from the export tax. The foreign rm has the opposite eect. On the
other hand, the last term in these equations is negative when  < 1=2 and positive
when  > 1=2. This shows that the negative (positive) eect can dominate when  is
suciently small (large).10
Lastly, we compare the home rm's Cournot exports with the Bertrand ones.
A standard argument suggests that Cournot competitors produce \too little" and
Bertrand competitors \too much" (Markusen et al., 1995). However, this argument
does not always hold. From (4) and (6), we establish Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Suppose that a monopoly carrier transports the products of rms.
Then, the home rm's exports under Cournot competition are larger than those under
Bertrand competition if and only if  > b  2(
p
2  1) ' 0:82843.
Proof. From (4) and (6), simple algebra yields xB   xC = [(1   c)2(4   4  
10The minimizer of exports in the foreign rm is smaller than that in the home rm. The reason is
as follows. The foreign rm has a larger market share than the home rm does because the home rm
pays an export tax. Although each rm reduces its product price when  increases, the foreign rm
enjoys a greater positive eect from this price reduction because of a smaller cost (or larger demand).
As a result, the foreign rm's export rapidly increases for .
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2)]=[(1 + )(10      2)(10      42)]. Solving the inequality xB   xC < 0, we
obtain 2(
p
2  1) <  < 1. Q.E.D.
The result of Proposition 3 is depicted in Figure 2. As previously found in Proposi-
tion 1, the optimal policy under Cournot duopoly is an export subsidy when the degree
of product dierentiation is suciently small (i.e.,  is suciently large). On the other
hand, under Bertrand duopoly, the optimal policy is always an export tax. In view of
output, an export subsidy reduces the export cost and increases output, but an export
tax increases the export cost and decreases output. As depicted in Figure 1, the subsidy
increases as the degree of product dierentiation decreases. Therefore, for a suciently
large , the quantity in the Cournot and Bertrand outputs may be reversed (see Figure
2).
[Figure 2 here]
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider changes in recommended export policy in a third-country
market model with product dierentiation when a monopoly carrier exists. Although
carriers and charges have a growing importance in international trade, these have not
been given much attention in existing studies on strategic export policy. We show that
under Cournot competition, the optimal policy is an export tax (subsidy) if the degree
of product dierentiation is large (small); however, under Bertrand competition, the
optimal policy is always an export tax. We also show that quantity in the Cournot
17
output of a subsidized home rm can be larger than that under Bertrand competition.
Our model developed herein shows opposite results to the standard strategic export
promotion argument. These results depend on the behavior of the monopoly carrier
and the interaction between transport charges and export policy. We believe that our
model oers a new insight in studies of trade policy.
August 7, 2015, 14:40 p.m.
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Figure 1: Optimal policy and exports in Cournot duopoly.
22
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Γ
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
HxB*-xC*LH1-cL
Figure 2: The dierence in exports of Bertrand and Cournot.
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